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I' COURTROOM OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
",.... 
I about -and that case was one in whrch the issue 
2 FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 2 was whether an attorney had a duty to a beneficiary. 
CASSIA COUNTY COURTHOUSE I 3 someone other than his c e n t  who had hired him to 
CASSIA COUNTY, BURLEY, IDAHO 
I 
' 4 prepare the wrll. 
5 AUGUST 10.2009, MONDAY. 1000 A.M. i And in deciding the case, the Court said. 
6 1 6 "We hold that an attorney preparing testamentary 
THE COURT: It's 10:00 A.M. on August 10th. / 7 instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named 
8 2009 The matter before the Court at this time is 8 or identified therern to prepare such instruments 
9 Case CV2009-517. and the issue is a motion by the I 9 and, if requested by the testator, to have them 
10 defense for summary judgment 1 10 properly executed so as to effectuate the testato<s 
11 Are the parties ready to proceed this i 11 intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. 
12 morning. 1 12 If as a proxrmate result of the attorney's 
13 MS. POINTS: Yes, your Honor. / 13 professional negligence. the testator's intent as 
14 MR. STROTHER: Yes. your Honor. 14 expressed in the testamentary instruments is 
15 THE COURT: Welcome to Cassia County Counsel. I 5  frustrated in whole or in part, the attorney is 
16 MR. STROTHER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Would you like to use the lectern 
I :: or are you comfortable using counsel table? 
119 MR. STROTHER If I feel naked, I'll go get 
the lectern 
16 liable to the beneficiary." 
17 The ruling of the case makes clear that 
18 it is the language as expressed in the testamentary 
19 instrument that is decisive, and in this case the 
20 testamentary instrument says that the testator is 
THE COURT All right. / 21 grving his Interest in trusts to the plaintiff. 
MR. STROTHER: Your Honor. Counsel spoke 
23 before and agreed that it might be more logical to 
24 take up the motion to strike the affidavit of 
22 Now, the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher is 
23 aimed at impeaching the terms of the testamentary 
24 instrument. The evidence is not consistent with the 
2: Mr. Fletcher first. I 25 testamentary instrument. it makes it appear that $ 1  3 5 
THE COURT: Oh, I wasn't aware of that issue. / 1 there was some doubt in the testator's mind as to 
2 is  there a pleading or a filing on that? / 2 whether he actually had property in a trust while 1 1 MR. STROTHER: Yes, sir. It was filed August 3 the will itself, which is attached to the affidavit 
4 of Mr. Fletcher. the will itself expresses no such 
5 doubts. 
6 The will says In paragraph --or clause 
7 six "All beneficial interests that I have in any 
8 trust I give, bequeath and devise to the plaintiff." 
1 9 There's no doubt there in --expressed in the 
10 testamentary instrument but that there is an 
11 interest in a trust. And what Mr. FletcheCs 
12 affidavit does is inject some doubt as to whether 
13 there is an actual interest in a trust and. 
14 therefore, it's impeaching the terms of the will. 
15 Now, the rule is generally consistent. I 
4 6th, I believe. 
THE COURT: The last pleading in my file was 







7 MR. STROTHER: I can provide the Court with a 
8 copy. 
9 THE COURT: Yes, if you would, please, and 
10 thank you fordoing that. Are there any additional 
11 pleadings that haven't made theirway to my file? 
72 MR. STROTHER: Not that I'm aware of, your 
13 Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. So the Court will 






16 to strike the affidavit handed to me by counsel. 
17 What I'd like to do is, of course, find out why I 
16 think, with the parole evidence rule that excludes 
17 evidence offered to impeach the terms of a document 
18 don't have that information but go ahead and receive 
19 your arguments both on that particular issue first, 
20 and then we'll take the summary judgment motion up 
21 in the context of that particular argument. 
22 MR. STROTHER: Your Honor, the argument behind 
23 the motion to strike Mr. Fletcher's affidavit is 
24 predicated on the case of Harrigfeld vs. Hancock. 
18 which is otherwise clear. in this case. the Court 
19 has held that the will was clear. therefore, you do 
20 not get to offer evidence into the record to impeach 
21 the terms of the will. 
22 It would be just like if it were a 
23 contract. I'm going to do X. You don't get to put 
24 in evidence that says we're going to do not X or 
25 and in that decision the supreme court after talking / 25 something thaYs almost X. 1i.s clear. You live 
I 
I:: 
with the will so long as it's clear. Here the 
parties have to live with - or you live with the 
contract in that case. 
In this case the parties have to live 
with the will, which is clear. You do not get to 
impeach the terms of the will, and any evidence to 
the contrary is irrelevant. Moreover, statements by 
the testator would not be admissible, and it follows 
that the statements by the testator's attorney would 
not be admissible because he's, in essence, just the 
agent of the  testator^ 
For these reasons, your Honor. we would 
ask the Court to strike the affidavit of 
Mr. Fletcher insofar as it tends to impeach the 
terms of the will at issue in this case. Thank you, 
sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Points. 
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, in the motion to 
strike -- untimely filed by plaintiff in this case. 
it was filed less than four days ago and it's, 
therefore, not timely under the rule, and we'd move 
that it be stricken on that basis alone --within 
that motion there's no legal authority cited by the 
plaintiff to establish that Mr. Fletcher through his 
7 
affidavit cannot provide testimony of the testator 
or his own testimony. Counsel's statement that 
Mr. Fletcher's affidavit impeaches the terms of what 
was contained in the will is absolutely incorrect. 
The plaintiff here has sued Mr. Fletcher 
for malpractice, and Mr. Fletcher was simply putting 
into context for the Court what had transpired 
between he and the deceased in coming to the 
culmination of what ended up in the will. And for 
the purposes of this motion, your Honor, if the 
plaintiff is willing to stipulate that there is no 
ambiguity in the will or the terms of the will: 
Mr. Fletcher would take that. 
The context given to the drafting of the 
will as provided was because plaintiff took an 
opposite position in the probate proceedings. If 
your Honor will recall, the plaintiff took the 
position that the will was absolutely ambiguous and 
the Court must consider affidavits of third parties 
in awarding her some award under the will. So the 
context was provided preliminarily to address the 
position that plaintiff had taken in the probate 
action that the will is ambiguous. 
In this action, your Honor, they're 
taking the position that the will is not ambiguous, 
I that it's clear on the face of its terms, and that's 
2 exactly what position Mr. Fletcher is taking. To 
3 the extent that the Court considers the affidavit in 
4 the terms of the duty issue -- To back up. your 
5 Honor, the motion for sutnmary judgment has three 
6 cruxes. One is the argument on the judicial 
7 estoppel claim. one is on the statute of 
8 limitations. and the third is on whether 
9 Mr. Fletcher had a duty to the plaintiff, which was 
10 spoke to by counsel. 
11 It is Mr. Fletcher's position that in the 
12 context of the argument with regard to duty there is 
13 no ambiguity in the face of the terms in the will, 
14 and the Court is limited to consider the four 
i 15 corners of the will in terms of duty. However, the 
/ 16 affidavit can speak to the issues of the estoppel 
/ 17 argument and the statute of limitations argument, 
and we would leave that within the Court's 
discretion to consider. 
Unless your Honor has any other 
questions. that's the defendant's response. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Reply. 
MR. STROTHER: With respect to the issue of 
timeliness, your Honor, it is the defense's 
9 
1 responsibility in pursuing a motion for summary 
2 judgment to offer admissible evidence, and we could 
3 have delayed raising this issue at all until today. 
4 The evidence is inadmissible, and this is the day 
5 set for argument on the motion, and we're were free 
/ 6 to argue today without notice to anybody that the 
/ 7 evidence was inadmissible. 
1 8  By filing the motion, we just intended to 
give a heads up, and we regret that you did not see 
the motion ahead of time to get that heads up, but 
that was the intent was to give the heads up so that 
everybody would be better prepared to address the 
issue today which, as I said, we didn't need to 
raise until today at all. 
We have no objection to Mr. Fletcher's 
affidavit insofar as it speaks to the issue of 
waiver and estoppel, that being conducted by the 
plaintiff, Ms. Soignier. The only parts that we 
object to are the parts that, as we said. tend to 
impeach the will and speak to matters which the 
Harrigfeld decision has said are not admissible. 
Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. All right. 
That all having been said then, let me take up your 
25 arguments with respect to the summary judgment 
10 
Mr. Bailiff. if you'd return to counsel the copy of 
2 the objection. Thank you for providing that to me. 
3 and I'll find where the orig~nal went. 
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, as I alluded to 
5 before, and I'm sure your Honor has had the 
6 opportunity to revrew what has been filed by 
Mr. Fletcher. the motion for summary judgment is 
/ 8 couched in terms of three arguments, that being 
9 judrciai estoppel statute of limitations and that 
10 Mr Fietcher owed no duty to the plaintrff based on 
11 
1 time of hrs death, those interests would be awarded 
11 the four corners of the testamentary instrument. 
With regard to the issue of estoppel, 
/ 2 to Ms. Soignier, was clear and unambiguous and 
3 entered a motion for summary judgment and order with 
4 that holding. 
3 
1 
13 your Honor. as you might recall in the probate 
14 action, the plaintiff in this case asserted a claim 
15 against Mr. Cowan's estate, and the basis of that 
16 argument was that there was an ambiguity in the 
17 will. that Mr. Fletcher had negligently drafted that 
18 will to contain those amblguities, and based on that 
19 negligence and based on that drafting, the Court 
20 should consider several affidavits filed by third 
21 parties. 
21 alleged or made reference and allegat~ons towards 
22 the negligent drafting by Mr Fletcher 
23 It's the posltlon of Mr Fletcher that in 
24 settling those clalms, Ms Solgnler settled all 
25 cla~ms against Mr Fletcher As this malpractice rs 
12 
I 22 Your Honor correctly, in Mr. Fletcher's 
23 view, found that there was no ambiguity in that 
24 will; that the provision in clause six that stated 






1 a - ) 
1 couched she is claiming that she has standlng as 
2 heir to Mr Cowan's estate for entitieinents that 
5 Thereafter, Ms. Soignier filed an appeal 
5 of that order and following the filing of that 
7 appeal settled her claims against the estate. The 
8 claims that were brought against the estate were 
9 based on her standing as heir to the estate And as 
10 we outlined both in our opening memorandum and our 
1 1 reply memorandum. the stipulation of her settlement 
12 was based on language which stated all claims that 
13 Ms. Soignier had as heir to the estate of Mr. Cowan 
14 were settled in this settlement agreement. 
15 Mr. Fletcher was listed as a party to that 
16 agreement, and Mr. Fletcher signed that agreement. 
17 And as is discussed in our reply brief, I 
18 think most recently, your Honor, there are notations 
19 in both the order that your Honor drafted and 
were somehow above and beyond that which she settled 
for in the probate case, and it's the position of 
Mr. Fletcher that she is judicially estopped from 
dorng so. 
The second facet of the motion for 
summary judgment is based on the statute of 
limitations. As set forth in our briefing. there's 
a two-year statute of limitations on an attorney 
malpractice claim. Mr. Cowan's will was drafted in 
May of 2006, and he died in October of 2006. 1 
won't regurgitate the legal arguments here, your 
Honor lt's Mr. Fletcher's position that the 
statute Of limitations ran on the earlier of two 
dates. which is the drafting of the will or, at the 
very latest. on the date of his death as that is the 
date that that will could no longer have been 
amended. And based on the findings of this Court 
and the apparent admission of plaintiff, there was 
no ambiguities on the face of that will, therefore. 
the terms of the wili controiied as of the date of 
his  death^ 
In anticipating what arguments might be 
coming from piaintiffs, your Honor, there are 
13 
several cases out there that support the proposition 
that in order to identify some damages, which is the 
hurdle which a plaintiff must establish in order for 
the statute of limitations to commence. the 
plaintiff has to assert that they have --or 
establish that they have suffered some damage prior 
to the commencement of the statute of limitations. 
There's the recent case that's cited by 
both parties. the City of McCall v. Buxton. In that 
case, your Honor. there are two different analyses 
for when some damages might accrue. There was two 
sets of claims in the City v. Buxton case. One had 
to do with the attorney ill advising the City to 
breach certain contracts and stop certain payments 
to some contractors. 
The supreme court held that until a court 
decided that those -the City had, in fact, 
breached the contracts and a jury found that they 
were --had to pay certain damages to the 
contractors, until that point they couid not 
determine whether they had incurred some damage. 
Therefore. the statute of limitations started to 
commence on the day the jury rendered its decision. 
There's another school of thought and 
another set of cases in the City v. Buxton case 
q't 
11 20 filings signed by counsel by Ms. Soignier that 
wh~ch we belleve are al~gned to Mr Fletcher's case j 1 it falls squarely within the facts o f z r  case, and 
and that is there were certain liens that were in 
place that were placed by the City against certain 
engineering firms, and on advice of counsel, the 
attorney for the City advised the City of McCall to 
release those liens. That was the day they had no 
more rights to come back against those engineering 
firms whether it was adjudicated in a court of law 
or not. i t  was ascertainable that they had incurred 
cerlain damages on that date, the date the liens 
were release& 
Analogous to our case, your Honor. on the 
date of Mr. Cowan's death. the unambiguous terms of 
that will could not be changed to incorporate or to 
add to any interests that Ms. Soignier would have 
received. If he had an interest in a trust on the 
date he died, she would have recovered something. 
If he didn't have an interest in a trust on the date 
that he died. he would recover -- she would recover 
nothing, which is what happened in this case. 
Therefore, some damages accrued on the date -- at 
the very latest the date of Mr. Cowan's death. 
The third portion of the motion for 
summary judgment is based on the issue of duty. your 
Honor, and that's what we've been jostling around 
15 
here a little bit in terms of the context of 
striking Mr. Fletcher's affidavit. And I think 
we've briefed pretty well the Harrigfeld case that 
was brought to the Court's attention by 
Mr. Strother. And the Court has alluded to this 
when it was drafting its probate decision, but the 
holding in Harrigfeld is --the intent of the 
testator is expressed only by the terms of the will, 
You can't go outside the four corners of the will to 
look at the testator's intent or look to extrinsic 
evidence. 
And if you look at the unambiguous terms 
of the will, there's nothing Mr. Fletcher did that 
would have affected Ms. Soignier's interests. It's 
clear on the face of its terms. There's no error in 
the drafting. The intent of Mr. Cowan is expressly 
and unambiguously set forth in clause six of the 
will. 
Because there is no ambiguity or because 
there is no error on the face of the will, and the 
Court can take as a matter of law that those terms 
are controlling as to his intent, there can be no 
violation of duty on the part of Mr. Fletcher And 
that's pretty clear. cut and dry, black and white 
letter law holding in Harrigfeld, your Honor. And 
16 
2 it falls squarely within the findings of this Court 
3 in the probate action and the admission of plaintiff 
4 that the terms of the will are unambiguous. and the 
5 intent is clear on the face. And nothing Mr. Fletcher 
6 drafted in there went against the will of Mr. Cowan 
7 as expressly set forth therein. 
8 And if the Court doesn't have any 
9 questions. I'll save the rest of my time for reply. 
10 THE COURT: I do have --I'm going to ask you 
11 to just take a moment and think through. It's 
12 always helpful to me in summary judgment if counsel 
13 will take a few moments or if it's already been -- 
14 you wish to do it in writing the issue of what facts 
15 are material and what facts are and are not in 
16 dispute is important to me. And so in support of 
17 the motion here, if you'd take a few moments and 
18 walk me through the facts that you believe are in 
19 dispute or are not in dispute so that I can focus in 
20 on those issues. 
2 1 MS. POINTS: Your Honor. with regard to the 
22 issue of duty in the context of the will, I don't 
23 believe there is any factual dispute as to the clear 
24 intent of Mr. Cowan as expressed in the unambiguous 
25 terms of the will, and I believe that through the 
I 
17 
1 opposition t i t h e  motion. plaintiff has tried to 
2 infuse some issues of fact with the affidavit of 
3 their expert. Mr. Magnuson, who attempts to say that 
4 there's some standard of care issue or that the 
5 trust that was specified in Mr. Cowan's will was, in 
6 fact, The Leonarda Cowan Trust. 
7 I think some issues of fact are. you 
8 know: attempted to be infused by plaintiff, but, 
9 your Honor, we don't believe that those are issues 
10 of fact that are relevant to what the Court has to 
11 consider today, and that is strictly whether 
12 Mr. Fletcher owed a duty or breached a duty to 
13 Ms. Soignier, because the case law is clear that the 
14 intent is taken from the four corners of the will. 
15 You can't look to the affidavit of 
16 Mr. Magnuson. You can't look to what Mr. Magnuson 
17 believes Mr. Fletcher should or shouldn't have done. 
18 The Harrigfeld case clearly establishes that you're 
19 limited to the four corners of the will unless 
20 there's an ambiguity. So it's Mr. Fletcher's 
21 position there's no issue of fact with regard to the 
22 duty. because it's clear and unambiguous, and you 
23 can stick to the Harrigfeld holding in that regard. 
24 And plaintiff, I'm sure, is going to 
25 argue through counsel that there is an issue of 
f8 
1 fact, but Mr. Fletcher's position is that there is 
2 not and certainly not which should preclude the 
3 Court from r~lling on the duty issue and the motion 
4 for summary judgment. 
5 With regard to the statute of limitations 
6 claims, your Honor, I similarly don't think there's 
7 issues of fact here. We're not talking about any 
8 issue of when the will was drafted or when Mr. Cowa 
9 died. Plaintiff is simply taking the position that 
10 they need a ruling from the Court to say she's out 
11 in terms of what she could recover under the will. 
12 and it's our position that that is not a required 
13 finding in this case. and the Court can determine 
14 that as a matter of law. I don't believe there's 
15 any issue of fact there that would preclude the 
16 Court from ruling as a matter of law on the statute 
17 of limitations issue. 
18 And similarly, I think that's the case 
19 with the judicial estoppel issue. You know. I 
20 believe plaintiff is going to argue that there has 
21 to be some representation in open court by 
22 Mrs. Soignier, that she really did mean it when she 
23 said she was going to settle her claims and there 
24 was no such statement. I don't believe that that 
25 creates an issue of fact, your Honor. I think that 
19 
1 Ms. Soignier in filing her settlement agreement with 
2 the Court and with all parties signing off on the 
3 agreement that the Court can take as a matter of law 
4 that she represented, yes, I'm settling the claims, 
5 and, yes, your Honor, you can act on that and file 
6 an order dismissing this case. And, in fact, she 
7 accepted $100,000 for that settlement. and none of 
8 those issues are material fact, your Honor. 
9 So. you know, there might be some 
10 jostling about the facts in terms of how it was 
11 briefed, but as it's set forth in the defendant's 
12 opening brief and reply brief, those are red 
13 herrings. These are really issues of law here, and 
14 nobody really disputes the facts that are present in 
15 the case. 
16 There could be some issues raised, again, 
17 by plaintiffs with regard to the duty issue, but if 
18 you look at the clear case law that pertains to 
19 whether there is or is not a duty, Mr. Magnuson's 
20 affidavit is completely irrelevant to that. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
22 Opposition to the motion. 
23 MR. STROTHER: It might shorten my remarks 
24 your Honor, if I may inquire of counsel whether she 
25 has waived the fourth rounds of the motion for 
1 summary judgment argued in her opening brief, that 
2 being waiver in quasi estoppel? 
3 MS. POINTS: No, your Honor, we have not 
4 waived those. We just simply chose not to raise 
5 them in oral argument as they're pretty analogous to 
6 the judicial estoppel argument and there's no reason 
7 to rehash. 
8 THE COURT: That clarifies that. 
9 MR. STROTHER: I don't know -- Turning to 
0 your question, your Honor, I don't know the best way 
1 to answer it. I think there are some differing 
2 views of the facts. The defense, for example, says 
3 that Mr. Fletcher was a party personally to the 
4 stipulation signed by the plaintiff in the probate 
5 proceeding. 
6 The plaintiff takes the position that's 
7 not true. To make the argument of quasi estoppel, 
8 the defense has to show some reliance by 
9 Mr. Fletcher personally, and if they're saying there 
!O is such reliance, we have an affidavit that says 
! I  there was no such --no consideration paid by 
12 Mr. Fletcher at all. 
13 To the extent that the defense is saying 
14 that Ms. Soignier waived claims against 
15 Mr. Fletcher, there's an affidavit by Ms. Soignier 
2 1 
1 that says that's not true. So there may be some 
2 issues of fact. It just depends on how you look at 
3 it. 
4 You have a document to construe, because. 
5 as I understand the defense's argument, it's all -- 
6 the arguments of waiver and estoppel and even of 
7 judicial estoppel are all predicated on that 
8 stipulation filed in the probate proceeding which is 
9 attached to Mr. Fletcher's affidavit. The Court's 
0 going to have to construe that. Now, whether you 
1 view that as issues of law or if you find some 
2 ambiguity in their issues of fact, I can't answer 
3 that for the Court. So there may be some issues of 
4 fact there. 
5 With respect to the statute of 
6 limitations, again, depending upon how the Court 
7 views it, there may be some issues of fact here. 
8 The question is. from our perspective, when did the 
9 plaintiff sustain damage? The defense has its view. 
0 We have our view. The Court may view that as an 
1 issue of fact or it may not. I don't -- again, I 
2 don't know how the Court is going to approach that. 
3 With respect to duty, I don't think there 
4 is an issue of fact. The only issue -- the issue is 
5 whether she was named in the will. That extends -- 
1 That means there is a duty. Much of what counsel 
2 argued today is really negligence saying there's no 
3 negligence. and it looks to me like there's a 
4 blurring of the --and there has been since the time 
5 of the opening brief, There's a blurring of the 
6 issue of duty and the issue of negligence. 
7 And it was -- To cover that. what we 
8 perceived as an ambiguity in the argument. 
9 Mr. Magnuson's affidavit was filed. But from a 
10 legal perspective, the Harrigfeld case says there is 
11 a duty if she's a named heir. She was a named heir. 
12 Therefore, there was a duty. So depending on how 
13 far you can take the defense argument. whether 
14 you're going to get into the issues that I believe 
15 are more negligence than duty, then there may. 
16 again. be an issue of fact, 
17 So, you know, that may be a more 
18 convoluted answer to your question than you had 
19 hoped for, but I think that from my perspective as 
20 an attorney. your approach to the issues are going 
21 to dictate, to some extent. whether they're issues 
22 of fact or issues of law, and that's a matter of 
23 your discretion that I can't foresee. 
24 Now. let's start with judicial estoppel. 
25 There's two - the  two leading cases. McKay and 
23 
1 Heinze v. Bauer both say there has to be a statement 
2 in court, and it says that the plaintiff has to 
3 receive the benefit and that there has to be an 
4 inconsistency between what was said in the original 
5 proceeding and what was said in this proceeding. 
6 Now, if you look at the stipulation, 
7 which is Exhibit B to Mr. Fletcher's affidavit, it 
8 says in the introduction, "Come now, Steven D. 
9 Westfall, the personal representative of the estate 
10 of Zachary A. Cowan, by and through his special 
11 counsel, Donald Chisholm, and the attorney of the 
12 estate. William Kent Fletcher." So Mr. Westfall is 
13 entering into a stipulation through his two 
14 attorneys, Chisholm and Fletcher. And then the next 
15 party is Mary Soignier coming through her attorneys 
16 William Whitehead and Stanley Cole. and the American 
17 Cancer Society coming through its attorney, William 
18 Parsons. 
19 So the parties to the stipulation are 
20 Westfall, Soignier and Parsons. Mr. Fletcher is 
21 involved only as the attorney for the estate. not 
22 himself. And if you go through this thing, it says, 
23 number one. all claims of Soignier under the last 
24 will and testament as heir, devisee, or holder of 
25 the power of appointment are settled for the sum of 
24 
1 $100.000. It doesn't - And the stipulation is 
2 between the estate and Ms. Soignier and then another 
3 beneficiary of the estate who has an interest in the 
4 outcome of the case. 
5 These are claims that are arising with 
6 respect to her claims against the estate. It says 
7 nothing about any claims against Mr. Fletcher, and 
8 Mr. Fletcher is not a party to the agreement. And 
9 if you look -- it is well established that a 
I0 stipulation is a contract, and Mr. Fletcher doesn't 
I 1  qualify as a third-party beneficiary under the terms 
12 of that contract because he's not identified as 
13 such, He is simply signing the agreement as an 
14 agent of the estate which is the benefit --or which 
I5 is the -- one of the parties to the agreement. 
16 Now, harking back to the Court's 
17 question, I suppose the Court could conclude that 
18 the stipulation is ambiguous as to whether 
19 Mr. Fletcher is signing in his individual capacity 
!O or simply as the representative of the estate, and 
!I then that would give rise, I suppose. to an issue of 
!2 fact. but from our perspective it is clear that 
!3 Mr. Fletcher is (a) not a party. and (b) not a 
!4 third-party beneficiary, and (c) that he has no 
!5 rights under the terms of the stipulation. 
25 
I Now. therefore, with respect to the 
2 judicial estoppel argument, there is no 
3 representation by the plaintiff that she's 
4 surrendering any claims against Mr. Fletcher and, 
5 therefore, there's no inconsistency between the 
6 stipulation and this case. And I want to contrast 
7 that with the McKay case in which the plaintiff was 
8 asked in open court, "Are you at all dissatisfied 
9 with the handling of the claiin of the minor?" And 
l o  she said no, and then she turns around and files a 
1 lawsuit indicating her dissatisfaction with the 
2 handling of the minor's claim. 
3 And in the Heinze case, a divorce case, 
4 as is typical, the judge asked the parties whether 
5 they had any questions or problems with the deal, 
6 and Heinze said at the time that the judge asked 
7 him, no, he had no questions and no problems with 
8 the deal. and then he turned around and filed a 
9 lawsuit predicated on the fact that he had problems 
lo and real issues with the deal that he had told the 
! I  judge he was accepting. We don't have anything 
!2 comparable to that in this case and, therefore, the 
13 argument of judicial estoppel fails. 
!4 I'll move now to the waiver and quasi 
!5 estoppel because it's related. Waiver, as the Court 
26 
knows, is the knowing relinquishment of a right. 
There is no statement of any rights against 
M r  Fletcher that are waived or relinquished in the 
stipulation, and, therefore. Ms. Soignier's 
affidavit that says I never waived and nobody ever 
claimed that I waived, and I never dreamed that I 
was waiving any claims against Mr. Fletcher is 
undisputed and must be accepted as true for purposes 
of this motion. And it's entirely consistent -- 
that testimony is entirely consistent with the 
stipulation. 
As respect to quasi estoppel. Ms. Soignier 
recited in her affidavit she received no 
consideration from Mr. Fletcher, and quasi estoppel 
requires reliance or a change of position by him in 
this case in his individual capacity. There is no 
such evidence in this case. Ms. Soignier's 
affidavit is the only testimony on point and, 
therefore, the argument of quasi estoppel fails. 
Now the statute of limitations argument. 
As I understand the defense's position, it is that 
Ms. Soignier -- and maybe the best thing that I can 
do is take the argument as stated in the brief where 
they say that she was damaged at the time of the 
drafting of the will or, at the latest, upon the 
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death of Cowan in 2006. And, incidentally, I'm sure 
counsel misspoke because she got it right in her 
brief. The will was written in 2005. March of 2005 
rather than March of 2006. Her brief is accurate, 
so I'm sure that it was an inadvertent misstatement 
on her part. 
And if you look at page eight of the 
brief, it says that she would - the plaintiff would 
have been damaged at the time of the preparation of 
the will in May of 2005 because there was objective 
evidence that Cowan did not have any interest in the 
trust at that time, which I guess means that if 
everybody was exercising omniscience, they would 
know a mistake had been made. And then it talks 
about that it had to -- the statute had to start 
running when Mr. Cowan died because the will could 
no longer be changed. 
The -- If you look, however, at the 
statute of limitations cases, they don't run on such 
factors, and if you take the plaintiffs position 
that there was -- you could objectively ascertain in 
2005 that a mistake had been made, therefore, the 
plaintiff was damages, that proves way too much. 
If you go through the statute of 
limitations, your Honor, let's take Bonz vs. 
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1 Sudweeks, one where a release of a lis pendens was 
2 filed in the wrong county. Of course, anybody who 
3 iooked would know objectively it was filed in the 
4 wrong county, and that is perhaps analogous to the 
5 defense argument in this case. If you look at the 
6 situation in its entirety, of course, you know 
7 there's no trust interest. But in Bonz v. Sudweeks 
8 it was filed in the wrong county. No question about 
9 it. But the Court didn't start the statute of 
o limitations at the time it was filed in the wrong 
1 county. Instead, the statute didn't start to run 
2 until the plaintiff lost something because a real 
3 estate deal that he wanted to do did not go through. 
4 In Elliott v. Parsons you have a poor 
5 structure of sale documents. And that was 
6 objectively ascertainable at the time. Was it done 
7 right or was it not? It was not done right and 
8 everybody could tell that, and yet the statute of 
9 limitations didn't start to run until the plaintiff 
0 incurred attorney fees in trying to fix the mistake 
1 that had been made. 
2 In Fairway vs. Petersen, there was a 
3 failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
4 Obviously ascertainable at the time, but the statute 
5 did not start to run until a claim prosecuted in 
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1 violation of that rule was dismissed. 
2 In Stride v. Weigel there were bad tax 
3 returns. Obviously ascertainable at the time, but 
4 there was no damage until a tax assessment was 
5 levied by the IRS. 
6 All of these cases go to show, your 
7 Honor, that the claim that Ms. Soignier was damaged 
8 when the will was written because she didn't - 
9 because there was no trust corpus at that time is 
0 wrong because --just because somebody -- if you're 
1 exercising omniscience could have seen that, that's 
2 not what starts the statute of limitations. 
3 That's why -- You know, if you had 
4 omniscience, any one of these cases I told you 
5 about, the statute would have started running, but 
6 instead you look for did the plaintiff lose money? 
7 Did the plaintiff lose a right? Did the plaintiff 
8 surrender property? Was there an adverse court 
9 decision? And the common thread there is not the 
0 theoretical situation. Is the situation worse or is 
1 the plaintiff going to have a harder case? It is is 
2 the plaintiff out something? 
3 And in the Bonz v. Sudweeks they were out 
4 the benefits of a real estate deal. In Elliott v. 
5 Parsons they had incurred attorney fees because they 
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= h e  mstake Too late but they saw the / 1 that's negl~gence 
2 mistake. They tried to fix it and. therefore, they 
3 were out money when they started incurring attorney 
4 fees. in Fairway v Petersen. there was an adverse 
5 decision on the court claim. In other words, a 
6 right was lost. In Stride v. Weigel the returns 
7 were laying there wrong a whole long time, but it 
8 wasn't until the IRS said. "Hey, you owe us money." 
9 Now they're out something, and so the statute starts 
0 to  run^ 
I So when in this case was the plaintiff 
2 out something? She wasn't out anything when the 
3 will was written. She wasn't out anything when 
4 Mr. Cowan died. She wasn't out anything until this 
5 Court ruled that she had no claim or that she was 
6 entitled to nothing. That is the earliest date that 
7 defense can point to that says that Ms. Cowan is out 
8 anything at all. And that's why this complaint was 
9 filed within two years of this Court's decision, and 
0 that's why it was timely filed. because that 
1 decision saying she had no claim under the will was 
2 the first time that she was out anything at all. 
3 Now, that brings us to the issue of duty. 
4 Now, I'm not real sure how the defense wants to 
5 construe that issue. but to the extent they're 
3 1 
1 saying that Cowan was Mr. Fletcher's client and the 
2 primary duty was owed to him, okay. that's an issue 
3 of law. To the extent that Ms. Soignier is a named 
4 party in the will, a duty is owed to her. 
5 Now, if that's what we're talking about. 
6 there is a duty, period. She's a named party in the 
7 will and, therefore, there's a duty. Now. that is 
8 -- in my view, your Honor, that's all the further 
9 the duty argument goes, Is she a named party in the 
o will as a beneficiary? Yes or no? If the answer is 
1 no. then there's no duty. If the answer is yes, 
2 then there is a duty. It's that simple. That's the 
3 duty argument. 
4 And here's where I can't tell what the 
5 defense is arguing. They go on to say. well, she 
6 got what she was supposed to get. That's a 
7 negligence argument. That's not a duty argument. 
8 They say the argument is duty. but from our 
9 perspective they're really arguing negligence, which 
0 is why Mr. Magnuson's affidavit was filed, We don't 
1 know if they're trying to call an apple an orange or 
2 if they really mean an apple, because if they're 
3 calling it an apple, we don't think the argument's 
4 going in the right way. But if the issue is did 
5 they fulfill the duty to the named beneficiary. 
~ ~ 
2 Is there negligence? Is there not 
3 negligence? Mr. Magnuson's affidavit says there was 
4 negligence. that and giving -- reading that 
5 affidavit and giving us the reasonable inferences 
6 from that, that if you're talking about a will --or 
7 a trust document and you're going to say that you're 
8 going to give certain interests arising under a 
9 trust document to the plaintiff, then Mr. Magnuson 
0 says you've got to do certain things, basically make 
1 sure the documents are coordinated so that the 
2 beneficiary. in this case Soignier, gets the will 
3 documents. And Mr. Magnuson says you've got to 
4 check various things. 
5 And Mr. Fletcher's argument --and here 
6 we get into the motion to strike. To what extent is 
7 his testimony relevant when he says, well, I talked 
8 to Mr. Cowan and there was some uncertainty here as 
9 to whether there were trust assets or not. Well, 
!O that's contrary to what the will says, because the 
!I will says there are trust assets, period. It's not, 
12 as counsel said. if I have trust assets. they go to 
13 Soignier. The will says I'm giving my trust assets 
14 to Soignier, period. 
15 Now. the issue here is not the same as it 
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1 was when your Honor was sitting in the probate 
2 court. There you were enforcing a will. And what 
3 does the will say? And we're going to do that. 
4 Here it is. Did the attorney properly write the 
5 will to effectuate the intent as stated in the will? 
6 That's a different issue, and, therefore, while the 
7 defense would have you say, well. I said the will 
8 was clear and, therefore, this case is over, that's 
9 not true. The issue is did the attorney in writing 
0 this clear language do what he was supposed to do? 
I You can write -- use clear language that 
2 is clearly wrong, and that's what Mr. Magnuson is 
3 saying is that they used very clear language, but it 
4 was just the wrong clear language. The defense 
5 blurs over that issue by saying because the issue -- 
6 because the language is clear, this case is over. 
7 Not so. And there's no -- And for purposes of this 
8 motion, Mr. Magnuson's affidavit is determinative on 
9 this issue that I believe is really one of 
0 negligence, although the defense characterizes it as 
I one of duty. 
2 Unless the Court has any questions of me, 
3 1 believe I'm done, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: So what you're asking me to do is 
5 to define the nature, scope and length of the duty 
will? 
MR. STROTHER: No. There either is a duty or 
there's not a duty. 
THE COURT: So you're not going into -- at 
this polnt you're saying a duty arose and that's as 
far as you need to go. 
MR. STROTHER: If the argument raised by the 
defense is purely duty, yes. If the duty - -  if the 
issue is did Mr. Fletcherfulfill his duty, then you 
have to get into some of these other issues, but I 
think that's a negligence issue. Whether he 
fulfilled his duty is a negligence issue, not a duty 
issue, The duty issue is simply a yes or no field. 
THE COURT: Whether there was a breach of the 
duty. 
MR. STROTHER: Whether there is a breach of 
the duty is a negligence issue. 
THE COURT: Yes. Okay. I just wanted to make 
sure I was tracking with you on that. 
MR. STROTHER: But whether there is a duty is 
simply yes or no. and that is a matter of law. And 
I think it's answered clearly by the fact that she 
is a named party or a named beneficiary in the will. 
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But then you get to did he fulfill the duty', And 
from where I'm sitting, that's a negligence issue. 
And then you get into Mr. Magnuson's affidavit and 
these other things, and that's where you say, well, 
okay, he has this duty and in fulfilling it, how far 
do you go and so on and so forth. 
THE COURT: That helps me, I appreciate that. 
MR. STROTHER: Any other questions, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I don't believe so. Thank you. 
Reply. 
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, I'II be brief. I 
1 that you're arguing arose because Ms. Soignier was I 1 consideration from Mr. Fletcher in that rega;d:' 
2 named as heir in this - -o r  beneficiary in this 
i 
just a have a few comments with regard to each of 
the claims. With regard to the judicial estoppel 
claim, there's no requirement in the case law 
speaking to the issue ofjudicial estoppel, 
including the McKay case or the Heinze case, that 
Mr. Fletcher be a party to the underlying case or 
the underlying litigation ofwhich the plaintiff is 
now taking an inconsistent position. 
The inconsistent position has been taken 
by Ms. Soignier, and there's no requirement in the 
case law that Mr. Fletcher be an official named 
party to any underlying action. Similarly, there's 
no requirement that Ms. Soignier receive any 
2 Boiled down, your Honor, this claim is 
3 brought by Ms. Soignier as an heir to Mr. Cowan's 
4 estate against Mr. Fletcher, and it is the simple 
5 position of Mr. Fletcher that Ms. Soignier is 
6 estopped from bringing that claim as an heir to the 
7 estate of Mr. Cowan because she settled it according 
8 to the strict terms of that settlement agreement. 
9 With regard to the statute of limitations, 
l o  again. as we stated in our briefing and I'II restate 
I 1  here briefly, your Honor, there's no question that 
I 2  the supreme court has required in certain cases that 
13 some damages do not accrue to a plaintiff asserting 
14 a malpractice claim until there is some judicial 
I 5  decision on that claim. There's no question about 
I 6  that. 
17 The cases cited by Mr. Strother support 
18 that proposition, but there's a distinction in the 
19 case law. There's a distinction between those cases 
20 that require some litigation to get a decision on 
21 which a statute of limitations can begin to accrue, 
22 and there's clearly case law that states you don't 
!3 need any litigation for that damage to accrue. 
24 In this case on the date that Mr. Cowan 
25 died, he had no claim -- or Ms. Soignier had no 
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1 claim under the unambiguous terms of his will, 
2 whether a court confirms it or not. That's the day 
3 she lost the right. That's the day that Mr. Cowan 
4 cannot come back and amend to say, oh, she gets X, 
5 Y, Z in addition or she does not. The day he died 
6 he did not have any interest in any trust, and 
7 that's the day she was out. 
8 With regard to the duty issue, we are not 
9 taking the position that the only question is duty 
lo and it's yes or no. And it's not briefed that way, 
1 and if I insinuated that in my argument, I did not 
12 mean to do so. How it's couched in terms of the 
13 motion for summary judgment is very clearly outlined 
4 in the Harrigfeld case. And the issue on 
I5 certification from the ninth circuit was does an 
6 attorney have a duty to an intended beneficiary 
17 under the will - -  under a will? And the ldaho 
I8 Supreme Court said yes, but in very narrow 
9 circumstances. 
!O So it's not just a question of duty; that 
!I is; if I'm a named beneficiary in a will does the 
!2 attorney drafting the will have a duty to me? The 
!3 ldaho Supreme Court specifically set out very 
!4 distinctly what that duty was and what an attorney 
!5 has to do to satisfy that duty. And I quote, "An 
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will and, if requested by the testator, to have them 
properly executed so as to effectuate the testatois 
interest as expressed in the will." 
So if this interest is effectuated in the 
will, that's the extent of the duty There is no 
issue of material fact in this case that Mr. Cowan's 
intent is expressly stated on the face of the will. 
The duty IS therefore satisfied under Harrigfeld. 
It does not matter that Mr. Magnuson 
files an affidavit that says I think Mr. Fletcher 
should have done X. Y, Z. The extent of the inquiry 
for this Court under Harrigfeld is whether the 
intent is effectuated on the face of the will, and 
there's no issue here that it is, in fact, 
effectuated. Therefore, the motion for summary 
judgment should be granted for Mr. Fletcher on the 
issue in accordance with Harrigfeld. 
Unless your Honor has any questions, 
that's all we have, 
THE COURT: I don't. Thank you. Counsel, do 
either of you or either side wish to have any 
additional time for supplemental briefing or has 
anything come up in this argument that counsel would 
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like to have some additional time on for briefing? 
MS. POINTS: Not from defense, your Honor. 
THE COURT: From the plaintiff? 
MR. STROTHER: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Therefore, then I'll consider the 
matter fully submitted as of today and will take the 
matter under advisement and issue a decision on the 
motion just as soon as possible. Thank you all. 
Travel safely going back home. Thank you. 
(Recess.) 
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